Author
– Shakuntala A. Singh Ph.D**
** Philosopher. Retired Principal and Head, Dept. of Philosophy, Joshi-Bedekar College, Thane, Maharashtra, India. Deputy Editor, Mens Sana Monographs
Paper presented at National Seminar on ‘The Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteen Century Onwards’ on 13th and 14th March 2008 at the Dept of Philosophy, University of Madras, Chennai.
Received: 5th December 2024.
Revised: 19th March 2025.
Accepted: 2nd April 2025.
Peer Reviewer: Anon
Introduction
Such a question, if not considered sacrilegious, must shock most people doing what goes in the name of ‘Indian philosophy’ today. For some others, it would be naïve, if not down-right foolish, to raise such an issue and would hardly be a matter worth spending one’s time and energy over. If the whole corpus of philosophical concepts originated and/or produced in the Indian sub-continent is not ‘Indian philosophy’, what else is it? What need, then, to discuss such an issue any further?
Those for whom the issue is so well and comfortably settled need not detain themselves any further. Unless a philosophical curiosity goads them on to see what, after all, are the arguments here presented. For those others in whose minds such a question has indeed arisen, and disturbed the smugness with which this concept is accepted and articulated, and for those others also who have always had a difficulty with the sweeping generalisations that are made about the whole corpus of philosophical thought that goes in the name of ‘Indian philosophy’, there maybe cause for reflection and study in perusing what follows.
We commonly hear statements like:
“Indian Philosophy is spiritual”.
“Indian Philosophy is synthetic”.
“Indian Philosophy is integral”.
“Indian Philosophy is moksa-centered”.
“Indian Philosophy is a way of life”.
“Indian Philosophy cannot be separated from Indian Religion”, etc.
What is meant by the concept ‘Indian Philosophy’ here? If we accept the statement, ‘Indian philosophy is spiritual’, then it obviously follows that it cannot be non-spiritual. What do we then do with all the non-spiritual concepts and arguments that go to form ‘Indian philosophy’? If we say, ‘Indian philosophy is synthetic?, what do we do with all those elements and methods which are non-synthetic but found in Indian philosophy? If we say ‘Indian philosophy is integral’, how do we account for all the diverse strands of thought and actualizations presented by the almost opposing Indian philosophical systems? If we say, ‘Indian philosophy is inseparable from religion’, what do we do with all those aspects of ‘Indian philosophy’ which have nothing to do with religion?
Are all these concepts, then, to be weeded out from the whole corpus? Or, one must make a sincere, if tortuous, attempt to show how there is the unmanifest in the manifest, and all these generalizations really do obtain in everything that goes in the name of ‘Indian philosophy’? Such attempts are indeed common and they have tended to preoccupy the mind besides accounting for a large volume of contemporary literature in this field. But a careful scrutiny of all such available literature must indeed highlight, if not expose, this essentially circumstantial and motivated approach, which often serves more to muddle up perspectives rather than clarify them for the modern philosopher. So that one can talk of the irreconcilability of opposing philosophical ideas as they have presented themselves down the centuries as having been well and truly reconciled in Indian thought. So that, one may not realize the paradox between a defender of a darsana tradition who considers philosophy as a way of life and yet does not lead his life according to the demands of that darsana except in the most superfluous manner (it may be he cannot do so because of the exigencies of the times in which he is born and the place in which he lives). Or the paradox between the highly spiritual and equally immoral wherein someone who performs all the sacrifices and yagnas etc. has no qualms about defending untouchability and such other social inequalities.
Now, this is not the occasion to launch into a social inquiry. So we may rest it at that. The point under consideration here is whether the vast disparateness and multiplicity of ideas and concepts that are presumably subsumed under the all-embracing term ‘Indian philosophy’ can be a legitimate proposition. For, to so label it means one seeks to project a monolith, a harmonious, self-sufficient, well-functioning whole, with hardly any serious or fundamental contradictions within. Harmonious, self-sufficient and well-functioning it may arguably be, for they are value-judgements, which proponents must indeed apply to their chosen field of study. But none can deny that there are vast and glaring contradictions pointed out by one sub-group of the other in this whole corpus. And what comes to mind is the statement of J.K. Galbraith when he called India a ‘functioning anarchy’. No less similar should be the feeling of any serious modern Indian philosopher who wishes to encompass within his reach the whole corpus of Indian philosophical thought and present it as one vibrant entity. Such an attempt is to search for an order, and system, which is basically impossible because of the very nature and manifestation of philosophical thought as has occurred in India down the centuries. It must only attempt to straitjacket that which has bloomed freely and luxuriously in the many directions that thought, when allowed freedom, does flower. To even attempt to bring them together truthfully will be to construct a philosophical ‘garden’, which will be a manifestation more of the beauty of the diverse flora within, than a manifestation of a garden-wall that binds such an efflorescence from without.
The Analogy of a Philosophical ‘Garden’
Now, of course, one may say that in a garden there may be different flowers present and yet one can get an idea of a garden that encompasses all of them. Similar is the situation with ‘Indian philosophy’, wherein different types of philosophical ideas present are like different types of flowers. This sort of analogy requires a closer examination.
What is it that we mean when we say that we see a garden? Do we see anything aside and apart from the entities that go to make the garden? You may say, we sense a gestalt, which is a product of the entities that compose it, and some philosophers may be prone to consider this gestalt as different from the entities that comprise it. This satkaryavadaasatkaryavada controversy is not our attempt to reconcile here, not that it can be reconciled, ever. The point is, when we make certain generalizations about the garden considering it as a whole, we are bound to stress the common elements that are present in its constituents, as well as distinguish the garden from the surrounding area. Now, to distinguish from the surrounding area, a boundary wall is extremely important. But also important is our ability to find out what is the common element in all that is present in the garden. One cannot say they are all flowers, for there are non-flowering plants as well. One cannot say there are only shrubs, for there are trees as well. (So as not to complicate matters further, we presume a garden without fountains and statues and concentrate only on the flora here). And yet in our gestalt we do get a feeling that this is a garden. This perception is because there is something common to all the components of this gestalt. This is the fact that all of them are plants (and in plants we include trees, shrubs, herbs, climbers, creepers etc. etc.) Moreover, all these are, and can become, part of a garden.
Furthermore, this is a garden, not a forest. What differentiates between the two is not plants, or a boundary, for both can have them, although they may be of different types. The garden has some order or continuity in its arrangements; the forest is haphazard, discontinuous and unplanned in its growth. The former involves human instrumentation, the latter is solely a product of nature. It is order and continuity that distinguish between the two.
Therefore, we have been able to extract three essential criteria in a garden: they are all plants, they are arranged in some order and they are present within a certain boundary. These three are necessary and, we may go as far as to say, sufficient conditions for an entity to be called a garden. Now, it may be a Moghul garden or a Zen garden; it may be a well-manicured one or a poorly maintained one; it may be a beautiful one or an unsightly one. All these are secondary issues. The presence of these three criteria qualify it to be called a garden.
If we apply this analogy to the corpus of thought that is called ‘Indian philosophy’, we will similarly have to stress that what we call ‘Indian philosophy’ is actually a corpus of diverse thought-streams. The only thing common to them being:
i) They are all philosophical thought streams;
ii) There is some sort of an order or continuity in their arrangement; and
iii) They are bound by the fact that they have originated and/or developed within the Indian sub-continent’s boundaries.
Any attempt to find out generalities in the components of a garden, especially as variegated a one as the Indian philosophical corpus, are bound to be inaccurate for they seek thereby to project an order where there really isn’t one. Similarly, all attempts to treat the Indian philosophies as a monolith must indeed be bound to fail at the beginning itself. There is an order, a systematic arrangement of concepts within schools, and one can find some commonalities between schools as well. But commonalities are not generalities. The former shows common concerns, which may be present in disparate entities, the latter presents a unified structure which may not be existent at all. For example, when we say that moksa is a common concern of most Indian philosophies, it is not inaccurate, for moksa, either in its confirmation or its rebuttal, is one of the common points of contact between systems. But from this statement when we jump to the general statement that ‘Indian philosophy is nothing if not a pursuit of moksa’, we immediately err, for many aspects of the Indian philosophies do not concern themselves with the pursuit of moksa, and some do not consider it a worthwhile goal, or even a purusartha.
It may help matters if we see the situation a little differently. Whether one agrees that one sees a garden or not, we cannot but agree that we see a number of plants arranged within a certain boundary. Which means there can be no argument over the fact that there is a corpus of systematic philosophical ideas, which have been presented to the philosophical world by India. That which we may call the Indian philosophical corpus is definitely and undeniably present. But to say that the Indian philosophical corpus is present is not to say that ‘Indian philosophy’ is present, unless one says the latter is an abbreviated form of the former. To say that this is self-evident hardly helps matters because when we use the idea ‘Indian philosophical corpus’, we are presupposing that there are a multitude of concepts and a variety of ideas that go to form it. Similarly, when we say ‘Indian philosophies’, we2 are stressing the fact that there are a multitude of self-sufficient systems, not just one. We are stressing and high-lighting this multiplicity and will not fall in the trap of trying to project it as the monolithical, self-sufficient structure without any internal contradictions. A corpus is just a body of thought, a group of ideas, which, being ideas, may be similar or dissimilar to ideas within the corpus, or to any other ideas in any other corpus anywhere else. The search for its very special attributes, its uniqueness, and its extra-ordinariness as disparate systems having commonalities is all right. But the general extrapolation that the monolith itself has certain distinctness is an argument that need hardly detain us. This does not mean that the ideas are not significant and worthwhile, or that they may not contain certain distinct attributes and some sort of an arrangement. On the contrary, it only stresses that its worth, its significance or its attributes do not depend on its exclusivity, or its chauvinistic superiority over other philosophical concepts and corpuses present elsewhere.
Some Conclusions
We may conclude by answering the following questions:
(1) Is an Indian philosophical corpus present? Answer: Yes.
(2) Are Indian Philosophies present? Answer: Yes.
(3) Is an ‘Indian philosophy’ present? Answer: Yes, only if ‘Indian philosophy’ is considered synonymous with the ‘Indian philosophical corpus’, or with the term ‘Indian philosophies’. No, if it is presumed to have a monolithical, self-contained and extra-ordinary structure. Such a presupposition is at the base of many philosophical attempts and such an image is sought to be projected by many proponents, maybe sometimes without their realization.
It is necessary to clarify which approach we take when, in ourselves and in other researchers in this field, to obtain a correct perspective. All throughout the discussions of ‘Indian philosophy’ presented herein, ‘Indian philosophy’ is considered synonymous with ‘Indian philosophical corpus or thought’ and/or ‘Indian philosophies’; there is no attempt to present it otherwise.
Can anyone speak for the whole of Indian Philosophy?
There is further, objection to anyone speaking for the whole of ‘Indian philosophy’, for no one can claim proficiency over the whole domain of this field. Neither did the ancients claim such expertise, or such spokesmanship. For ample reasons, for they never considered their expertise to even possibly encompass as variegated a field as the Indian philosophies. All attempts to claim generality and expertise over the whole field will only land one in failure, and make it liable to such generalizations whose riders as to exceptions may often outweigh the rules themselves. Why, in fact, should such an enterprise at all be indulged in, should be enquired into, and shunned by the more prudent.
That, of course, does not mean that there is no body of thought that can be labeled as ‘Indian philosophy’. It is a body of thought, remember, containing varied and disparate elements, widely ranging and conflicting with each other, and in such variety and conflict lies as much its attraction as its strength. It is the Indian Philosophical Corpus.
Of course, to say that none should speak for ‘Indian philosophy’ as a whole, for he cannot claim such expertise, is only in so far as one discusses the Indian philosophies with fellow researchers and initiates. That should not preclude giving an overview, or making some general statements to uninitiated but intelligent lay audiences, to philosophy students, or to uninitiated philosophical audiences from another tradition; of course along with the rider, expressed or unexpressed, that speaking for the whole of the Indian tradition is not because one has expertise over the whole of it, for that is impossible, but because one has more than a passing acquaintance with much of the thought that comprises it.
To then answer the question:
Question: Can anyone speak for the whole of Indian Philosophy?
Answer: No, if one is speaking to fellow researchers and experts. Yes, if one is speaking to lay, uninitiated but intelligent audiences, to philosophy students, or to uninitiated philosophical audiences from another tradition.
Acknowledgements
The Author acknowledges, with thanks, the organizers for inviting her to present the above paper.
Conflict of Interest
The Author is Deputy Editor, Mens Sana Monographs.
Reference and Notes
- “The baffling paradox of a country which is felt by almost every foreigner to be, at one and the same time, the most spiritual and the most immoral…” Daya Krishna, ‘Three Myths about Indian Philosophy’, In: Indian Philosophy – A Counter Perspective, p. 7. Oxford Uni. Press. Delhi. 1991.
- It is interesting to note in this connection that Karl Potter calls his work, ‘Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies’, not, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy’, probably to stress the variegated nature of this corpus of philosophical thought. See Karl H. Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol I-XI, Motilal Banarsidass. New Delhi 1970- 2006. [Vol XII on Yoga Philosophy in press.] See also http://faculty.washington.edu/kpotter/encyclo.html (Accessed 12 Mar 2008).