Author
– Shakuntala A. Singh Ph.D**
** Philosopher. Retired Principal and Head, Dept. of Philosophy, Joshi-Bedekar College, Thane, Maharashtra, India. Deputy Editor, Mens Sana Monographs
Paper presented at World Philosophy Conference, Platinum Jubilee Celebration of Indian Philosophical Congress, Dec.28, 2000 to January 01,2001, New Delhi, India.
Received: 5th December 2024.
Revised: 19th March 2025.
Accepted: 2nd April 2025.
Peer Reviewer : Anon
What is it that characterizes most Indian Philosophies as a distinct body of thought? Even if their concerns appear diverse, their methods different, there is a centrality that pervades all these systems. This, according to most authorities, is an a\invariable connection, if not constant concern, with liberation or moksa’. Whether is is Samkhya’S prakrti-purusa viveka, Bhartrhari’s language-analysis, Nyaya’s analysis of thought-structure, the Vedantin’s idealism, the Buddha’s Eight-fold path, the Jaina’s ethical realism-all these, following different pathways are united in their convictin that they lead to liberation.
Now, what is this liberation? There are various nuances to the concepts of Moksa, amaratva, mukti, kaivalya, nirvana, nithsreyasa, apavarga (as also, to a limited extent, jivanmkta, samadhi and sanyasa) which one could study and analyse. That is not the point at issue here. The point at issue is: Is the concept of liberation not one that, in its essence, is connected with the disembodied person or the incorporeal being, the nonmaterial part of the self? And if the spirit stands for that which is the disembodied self or the incorporeal being, is not the concept of liberation a spiritual one? I think we have to accept that it is so. In fact, it cannot but be so. Liberation is a spiritual concept, spiritual as distinct from, thought connected with, the corporeal, material, physical world in which we live. Hence we can say that a spiritual concept like liberation is the predominant concern of most Indian Philosophies. It may not be that obvious at a certain stage of their elaboration. For example, it may not appear to be the predominant concern of Nyayayika when he is engaged in tracing the intricacies of logic, or a Grammarian when he is doing similarly with Vakya. But is runs as a strong undercurrent eve in these thought streams. Proof of this if proof be needed, is their continuous emphasis whether of logical structure or of language, is the pathway to perfection, release from bondage, and therefore, liberation.
Having understood the central importance of a spiritual concept in almost all Indian Philosophies, let us go on to another aspect of Indian life. Religion.
What is that characterizes religion? Religion involves dogma, creed, followers, belief in a divinity, God, after-life etc. But there can be religion without God or belief in after-life. There can be religion that is non-dogmatic in the sense that it allows for reason and does not expect blind obedience to scriptural or canonical authority. Still a minimum of dogma, with a groups of followers and a creed, are essential to religion. But they are not characteristic only of it. They are necessary even for most political ideologies, for example. Even an element of dogma and faith are essential for political ideologies. So it is not these that are its distinguishing characteristics, although they do form part of religion.
If it is not dogma, faith, followers, God, after-life etc. that characterize religion, then what is it that does? (By characterize I mean as serving both to stress its essential characteristics as also to distinguish it from others). We shall be led to the thought that every religion has some characteristic concept that is other-wordily, non-corporeal, nonmaterial-in other words, of the spirit, the spirit as distinct form the body and the physical objects of this world. Religion may regulate the affairs of this world, may be very much concerned with such regulation and the good life. But it bases such regulation some spiritual concept of what man’s existence and his state following it (call it heaven, hell, liberation, union with the divine, whatever) is all about. The essence of religion, therefore, is spirituality. Now this spirituality can take various forms. For some it amounts to belief in God, for others in an after-life, for someone else in karma, for others still in Heaven and Hell, and for still others in Moksa, Liberatin, Nirvana, Kaivalaya, Apavarga etc. All these can be subsumed under the broad category of spirituality.
Now the problem is as follows. The most important characteristic of most Indian Philosophies we saw was their spiritual concerns. We however find that the most important characteristic of religion also is spiritual concerns. Are e we then to believer, as a group of thinkers still believes, that most Indian Philosophies are nothing but religion? And if they are noting but religion, can they be the proper concern philosophy as an analytical discipline ? They can be the concern of philosophers of religion, but can they be the concern of Philosophy as an analytical discipline? Can therefore there be Indian Philosophies which have concepts to contribute in all the major disciplines commonly attributed to philosophy epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, language, etc? Aren’t the attempts of present -day Indian ‘philosophers’ to show that Indian ‘philosophies’ do have these sub-divisions only culling out stray strands of analytical thought in the all encompassing ocean of Indian religion, the former always a part, and a subservient part, of the latter? Are not therefore most Indian ‘Philosophies’ either only religion, or at most philosophy of religion?
There is nothing really new about these questions. In fact they have been raised, and raised ad nauseum for some, in that only reflecting probably an identity-search that characterizes most postcolonial societies. The obsessive concern with such questions often approach a hypochondriacal malady. This is so because the concerns, rather than helping to get done with them and get on with further concerns, have helped to entangle and preoccupy the meanderer who appears enmeshed in these questions for their own sake.
Be that as it may. We may say that different thinkers have tried to answer this question in their own ways. But we could perhaps resolve this difficulty by accepting that there is an essential difference between composition and method. By composition I mean what goes to compose a certain system, its components, its subject matter. By method, I mean the means or instrument one uses to compose or study these components.
That such differentiation is essential in the study of the Indian Philosophies, as of most other branches of philosophy, will be clear in a minute. Spirituality is characteristic of most Indian Philosophies as much as of religion is true as far as spirituality as a component of both is concerned. As regards the method used to understand or study this spirituality, religion and philosophy can be markedly different. Whilst religion would use the methods of prayer, rituals, bhakti, belief etc. to achieve what it considers spiritual goals, the philosopher would use analysis, understanding, conceptual clarification, as his methods, Of course one can trace instances where these appear commingled, especially when meditation and intuition come into the picture. But the intuition and meditation of a man of religion is invariably used to support a belief system, while the intuition and meditation of a philosopher must be used to initiate or support an analytical thought process. This differentiation is imperative to avoid merging of identities. But merging of identities commonly does take place, and that is only proof that both philosophy and religion are enterprises of man, and man is a composite being, not wholly analytic, not wholly believing, using both for different occasions and occasionally erring in so doing by mixing them up. That is of course the reason why the philosopher as a man cannot be totally rid of methods that are non-analytic: this may be considered his weakness as a philosopher, meaning thereby the strength of his philosophizing would be indirectly proportional to the amount of non-analytic thought processes he allows in his thinking and convictions. Probably similar must be the dilemma of the man of religion. The more he allows for belief and faith, the more religious he becomes. The more he allows for reason and analysis, especially in matters which can only be settled by faith, the less religious he is likely to find himself. How probably should man, who is not only a believer but also an analyser, for man who is not only a philosopher but also a living, breathing, overawed microcosm in this vast universe, conduct himself and his enquiries into his own mysteries, as well as the mysteries of this world, will have to be settled by each one at his own personal, highly individual, plane. And settled only to appear constantly unsettled. But this much can surely be said. If philosophy as a branch must be differentiated from religion, then its differentiation is possible only by the method it employs. And the mark of a philosopher would rest in how far and how well he can use this analytical method to study the concepts that come within his compass. It is not that the religious man may not also analyse. But his analysis is always sub-servient to his predominent concern -that of justifying a transcendental concern. For the philosopher, however, the analysis is not subservient to anything -it may become the means to achieve a transcendental concern, as it dà es in the Indian philosophies, where it is the mans to achieve liberation. But it is not subservient to it, it is not its hand-maiden. If analysis is carried out, by a Nyayyika of thought structure, for example, properly, for its own sake, fully and totally, it would lead to ni’zcreyasa: it would lead to nihcreyasa almost automatically -the end must follow. In this there is no need to think, or believe, that understanding of the sixteen padarthas of Nyayasutra 1.1.1 is subservient to the attainment of the highest good. In fact such an undertanding of Nyya is rendering religious meaning into the Nyya text which may amount to corrupting it.
For religion, on the other hand, every analytic concern is necessarily guided, nay limited, in this manner. In fact that is the reason why the man of religion limits his analysis, and limits the questionings of those who come within his power, to impress upon them the futility of logical or analytic pursuits, which he considers impediments, beyond a certain reasonable limit, to the attainment of liberation. The Nyayayika and the Grammarian put no such limits or impediments to their analytic concerns. In fact they firmly believe that the analysis of thought structure, and language structure, in all their nuances are the legitimate pathways to liberation; they would, thus, seek to further and further utilize the analytical method till they reach their goal. (Of course one can here quote numerous instances wherein logic and reasoning have been criticized in Indian thought, in the texts of the Mahiibhärata, Rämayana and Manusmriti, for example; but they are obviously referring to use of logical method for improper ends, use of arguments not because they lead to enlightenment, either of the arguer or his debater, but as means to put down or refute the superior thought content of the other by dishonest tricks of debate). So, whereas, for the man of religion, any analysis is subservient to his transcendental concerns, for a philosopher his analytical concerns are a means to achieve transcendental concerns. This differentiation is quite clear-cut in thought systems like Nyya and Grammarians, although is may not remain that clear-cut in some of the more idealistic systems. But even there it should be possible to separate out the religious from the philosophical concerns, if such a differentiation is considered necessary. In fact it may help both the Indian Philosophies and religions. For when both know their legitimate domains, good neighbourly relations and healthy give and take can follow. Good neighbours are neighbours, they give and take, but they know their boundaries, and remain within them. They do not merge boundaries, or identities. This could very well happen with the Indian Philosophies and Indian religions, and come to think of it, may be a worthwhile, nay necessary, enterprise.
Hence it is in their method that Indian religions and the Indian Philosophies differ. Although the religious thinker may study and mouth philosophic concepts, he does so within the predominent concerns of his religious belief system. Similarly, although the Indian philosopher may. Study and mouth religious concepts, he does so within the predominent concerns of his philosophical analytic system.
Would it not therefore be better to characterize the Indian philosophies as distinguished not by their spirituality, because their spirituality, rather than distinguish them from religion, makes them seem dangerously close to it? Would it not be better to characterize them by their method, by the fact that they utilize analysis and reason which therefore are what are their distinguishing characteristics? This would, morever, further underscore their affinity to the universal body of thought that goes in the name of philosophy everywhere, and would therefore be doubly beneficial?.
This is again1.a very important point, which we must take up here. Of course philosophies are characterized by conceptual analysis. But it is philosophies that are characterized by analysis. When we add the qualifying word Indian to philosophies we are adding a componential word, a word that seeks to qualify what the subject-matter of their philosophies has to be. In other words, in the two words Indian and philosophies of the concept Indian Philosophies, ifthe word philosophies stands for he analysis of concepts, the word Indian stands for the components Or Subject-matter of such analysis. And what, as we saw, was the essential characteristic of this component or subjectmatter in the case of most Indian philosophies ? It is spirituality. Whether we like it or not, whether we care for spirituality or transcendental concerns or not, whether we are theists or atheists, we cannot escape this conclusion (which is probably why all Indian Philosophers are not Indian philosophers. See Karl Potter, 1985, in this connection)°. We therefore cannot but be led to the conclusion that most Indian philosophies’ distinguishing characteristic is their involvement with the analysis of spiritual concepts.11 By undertaking analysis they differentiate themselves from religion. By tackling spirituality, however, they manifest their affinity to it. This diversity of perception is to be grasped and understood.
Once this is done, questions like : Are Indian Philosophies philosophy at all, or are they religion? Are they spirituality ? Are they only a philosophy of religion? become answerable. Indian philosophies are philosophy because they analyse concepts, concepts that go to form philosophical systems which include epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and theory of value, philosophical method, aesthetics etc. They are not religion, because, although they tackle spirituality, they analyse it, do not only accept it as part of a belief system. They are spiria..y in the sense that their subject matter is spirituality. They are not spirituality in the sense of using the method of a spiritual saint or monk-of prayer, bhakti, rituals, meditation on or communiom with a supreme power or deity etc. Are they only philosophy of religion? They are philosophy of religion, for they analyse the concepts that go to form religion. But they are not only philosophy or religion, for although they deal with spirituality which is their dominant characteristic (as it is of religion), they analyse it, and while doing so tackle all the various facets of man’s cognitive enterprise that are available to
Acknowledgements
The Author acknowledges, with thanks, the organizers for inviting her to present the above paper.
Conflict of Interest
The Author is Deputy Editor, Mens Sana Monographs.